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LEGAL ETHICS IN THE BID RIGGING CASES
Anthony F. Troy*
As a member of the Bar, one can never be too conscious of the
ethical duty owed to the client, to the system of justice, and to the
general public. Members of the public are viewing the legal profes-
sion with increasing skepticism. Even the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court recently asked rhetorically whether
the decline in the public standing of attorneys is the product of a
general impression that our profession is lax in dealing with incom-
petent or dishonest lawyers.1 Ethical issues arise in many settings.
This article will focus mainly on the ethical issues which arise dur-
ing the representation of highway contractors in an antitrust
investigation.
The term bid rigging is generally associated with an agreement
among competitors that a particular contractor will be the success-
ful low bidder on a contract. Although there is disagreement re-
garding the impact of bid rigging on the prices the state ultimately
pays for services,2 the case law is clear that bid rigging is a per se
violation of the federal antitrust laws.3
I. VIRGINIA'S Bm RIGGING CASES
In United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp.,4 the Fourth Cir-
cuit characterized bid rigging agreements as "little less than a car-
tel, which is 'never legally nor economically justifiable.' "5 The
* Partner, Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore; B.A., 1963, St. Michael's College; LL.B.,
1966, University of Richmond. Mr. Troy is the Chairman of the Antitrust Section of the
Virginia State Bar and is a member of the Virginia and District of Columbia Bars. This
article is adapted from a speech presented in a Symposium on Legal Ethics at T.C. Williams
School of Law on November 16, 1984.
The author wishes to thank Robert D. Seabolt for his invaluable assistance in the prepa-
ration of his remarks and this article.
1. Pike & Harrison, The True Story on Lawyer Discipline, ABA J., Sept. 1984, at 92, 94.
2. Bid Rigging, Richmond News Leader, Oct. 22, 1981, at 12, col. 1 (editorial).
3. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. Id. The author had the fortune-or misfortune-to try the Portsmouth Paving case
twice during an eight-week period in 1981. Whenever cases are referred to generally in this
article, they refer to cases involving clients of the author's law firm only.
5. Id. (quoting 1 R. CALLmANN, THE LAW OF UNFAm ComLrrxoN TRADEMARKS AND Mo-
NOPOLIES § 4.20, at 109 (4th ed. 1981)).
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Fourth Circuit has also said that "[t]he undisputed effect [of bid
rigging] is to force the contracting government entities to pay more
for the goods and services sought than they would 'had there been
free competition in the open market.' "
Beginning in 1979, the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice began an investigation into allegations that
the highway construction industry in Virginia was rampant with
bid rigging on road construction and resurfacing projects approved
by the Virginia Department of Highways. The indictment in Ports-
mouth Paving charged three Tidewater area corporations and
eight individuals with conspiracy to allocate contracts and rig bids
on more than 250 contracts over an eighteen year period.7 The first
Tidewater bid rigging trial began on February 23, 1981, and ended
in a hung jury after nearly two days of deliberations.8 Following
this mistrial, the defense maintained that a second trial would vio-
late the Double Jeopardy Clause because the jury in the first case
was dismissed without having received proper instruction on how
to break a deadlock. The Fourth Circuit, however, denied the mo-
tion to bar a retrial, and the Supreme Court of the United States
refused to intervene. After a ten-day second trial in April, 1981,
Portsmouth Paving Corporation, its president, and the three re-
maining codefendants were found guilty.9 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the convictions in 1982.10
In the 1983 trial of United States v. Marvin V. Templeton &
Sons, Inc.," a Lynchburg paver was acquitted by a Roanoke jury.
Among the other noteworthy bid rigging cases in Virginia, two
highway contractor defendants pled nolo contendere to bid rigging
charges; four other bid rigging indictments against highway con-
tractors went to trial between 1981 and 1983, resulting in a total
record of three convictions, three acquittals, and one hung jury.12
6. Portsmouth Paving, 694 F.2d at 317 (quoting Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 234 (3rd
Cir. 1942) (describing a collusive bidding scheme to defraud the United States)).
7. Portsmouth Paving, 694 F.2d at 315.
8. Id.
9. Id. Portsmouth Paving Corp. was fined $400,000 and its president was fined $30,000.
The president of Portsmouth Paving Corp. was also sentenced to imprisonment for a period
not to exceed 120 days. Id. at 315-16.
10. Id. at 325.
11. No. 83-00001 (W.D. Va. 1983).
12. This list does not count the numerous pleas of guilty and nolo contendere entered in
these cases. One estimate is that the highway bid rigging investigation in Virginia produced
$5,670,000 in corporate fines (among seventeen firms), $215,000 in personal fines, and total
jail time of 1,622 days among twenty-six individual defendants.
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There has probably never been a more intense concentration of
federal prosecutorial resources in Virginia than in the highway bid
rigging investigation between 1979 and 1983.
Il ETHICAL ISSUES
To understand how the various legal ethics issues affect the rep-
resentation of highway contractors, it is necessary to go back to
1979 when the investigation began. The highway contractor's first
indication that he and/or his company were under investigation
came in the form of a subpoena from a federal grand jury in Rich-
mond. The subpoena commanded either the production of docu-
ments or the appearance of one or more officers of the company to
testify before the grand jury.
A. Conflict of Interest
In advising a client on how to respond to such a subpoena, a
fundamental ethical issue to consider is whether it is proper for
counsel to advise and represent both the company under investiga-
tion and its various officers, all of whom may have been designated
"targets" of the grand jury. A variety of resources are available to
guide an attorney in determining whether a conflict of interest ex-
ists in representing a corporate client and its various officers and
employees who are subjects of a single investigation.
The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility requires a law-
yer to refuse "to accept or continue employment if the interests of
another client may impair the independent professional judgment
of the lawyer." 13 Furthermore, the Code requires that "[a] lawyer
13. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 5-105 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
VA. C.P.R]. "Differing Interests" are defined as "every interest that will adversely affect
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it will be a conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse, or other interest." Id. Definitions (1). Throughout this article, refer-
ences will be made to three different parts of the Code: first, Disciplinary Rules (abbrevi-
ated as DR); second, Ethical Considerations (abbreviated as EC); and third, Canons. These
parts of the Code are explained as follows:
Canons are statements of axiomatic norms expressing in general terms the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the pub-
lic, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general
concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations are derived.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Canons and Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character, as stated in DR 1-102(A)(1). The Disciplinary Rules state
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action ....
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shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another cli-
ent. '14 Of course, any disability that applies to one attorney affects
his partners or associates within the same firm.15 A lawyer or law
firm is permitted , however, to represent multiple clients "if it is
obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and
if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of each."' 6
With each of the corporate paving clients counseled in a bid rig-
ging investigation, it is necessary to consider at the outset that the
possibility of a conflict of interest in representing the company and
one or more officers or employees may arise. If a potential conflict
exists, the usual rule is to represent only one defendant. There
might exist some instances where, for several reasons, both the
company and the officer could be represented. Such instances may
include: where the officer was either the sole stockholder or owned
the controlling interest in the company; where for all practical pur-
poses the officer was strongly identified in the community as the
company; or where the officer's alleged unlawful activity has re-
sulted in the company being investigated. 7 The determination of
"no conflict" should only be made after full and complete discus-
sion with the officer and with others in the company who have an
ownership interest. 8
A different philosophy, however, should be followed when the in-
vestigation focuses not only on a corporation and an officer, but
also on a lower level employee. In such a case, the conflict envi-
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objec-
tives towards which every member of the profession should strive ....
Id. Preamble.
14. Id. DR 5-105(B).
15. Id. DR 5-105(E).
16. Id. DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added).
17. For a discussion of factors influencing the propriety of representing multiple defen-
dants, see Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA.
L. REV. 939 (1978).
18. An Ethical Consideration deems it
[e]ssential that each client be given the opportunity to evaluate his need for represen-
tation free of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus
before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client
the implications of the common representations and should accept or continue em-
ployment only if the clients consent.
VA. C.P.R., supra note 13, EC 5-16; see also id. DR 5-105(C); text accompanying note 16.
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sioned in the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility is obvi-
ous. In some instances it could be to the individual's benefit to
cooperate with prosecutors in the investigation of the company or
its president. For example, the prosecutor may be willing to pro-
vide immunity to the lower level employee in order to obtain evi-
dence against the corporation or its officer.19
In each of the Virginia highway construction bid rigging cases
with which the author is familiar where the lower level employee
retained separate counsel, the company paid the legal fees for the
employee without hesitation.20 In each case, the employees re-
tained competent attorneys who exercised independent judgment
on their behalf, but also cooperated with the corporate counsel
during the investigation. Such cooperation generally helps both the
corporate defendant and the employee, especially in situations
where the employee remained on the job. The employee's knowl-
edge, that both his personal counsel and the company's counsel
were "working together" on the investigation, tended to ease ten-
sion at work.
Having the lower level employee retain separate counsel can also
help the company. Indeed, in some situations it may benefit the
employer to fire or suspend the employee for violating the anti-
trust laws. This action may be necessary to demonstrate that the
company has and enforces an antitrust compliance program. This
course was not considered in the majority of Virginia bid rigging
cases, but it was an approach taken in a bid rigging case tried in
Newport News in 1982, involving Basic Construction Company of
Newport News.21 The corporation's defense rested almost entirely
on the position that it had a firm company policy requiring compli-
ance with the antitrust laws, and that it had fired the employees
who were found to have engaged in collusive bidding practices.2"
The company was found guilty, however, and the conviction was
19. See ANTrrRUST SECTION, AMERCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST HANDBOOK ON GRAND
JURY INVESTIGATIONS 89 (1978) (giving additional illustrations of situations which may pre-
sent conflicts of interests).
20. The Code allows the attorney for the lower level employee to accept compensation
from the employer only after "full and adequate disclosure under the circumstances." VA.
CP R, supra note 13, DR 5-106(A). Furthermore, even if the lower level employee's attor-
ney is paid by the employer, the attorney should exercise his independent professional judg-
ment solely on behalf of the lower level employee. Id. EC 5-21, 5-22 & 5-23.
21. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371
(1983).
22. Id. at 573.
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affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.23
In addition to being aware of the position on conflicts of interest
taken by the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, it is im-
portant to recognize that Rule 44(C) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure now requires a court, in a multiple representation
case, to conduct its own inquiry into the existence of a conflict.24
Furthermore, representation of multiple clients may require con-
sideration of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in June, 1984, held that multiple repre-
sentation of codefendants directly implicated such right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.2 5
Pursuant to Rule 44(C), the courts inquired into the existence of
a conflict in each of the Virginia bid rigging cases, because in each
case both a corporate defendant and the president of the company
charged with illegal conduct were represented by common counsel.
The courts were satisfied that no such conflicts were present, pre-
sumably on the ground that the corporations were small, closely-
held, family businesses where the individual defendant had either
sole ownership or a controlling interest in the company. Although
the prosecutors in the Virginia bid rigging cases did not raise the
conflict issue, it is important to be aware that the government may
challenge, under Rule 44(C), any multiple representation of
codefendants. 26
23. Id. at 575.
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 (stating in part: "Unless it appears that there is good cause to
believe no conflict of interest is likely, to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be
appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel."). It is important to note that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to "all criminal proceedings in the courts of the
United States." FED. R. CRIM. P. 1.
25. Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1056 (1984) (asserting that if a person is
denied his choice of separate counsel, his sixth amendment rights are violated and his con-
viction will be reversed, whether or not he suffered prejudice).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that a
court may disqualify an attorney representing multiple criminal defendants even though all
of the defendants want the same attorney); In re Investigation before the February, 1977
Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 1977) (asserting there is an impermissi-
ble conflict of interest when an attorney is unable to advise a client to cooperate or seek
immunity since to do so would prejudice another client).
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B. Coordination of Efforts in Conducting a Defense
1. The Confidentiality Requirement
A second ethical issue which was confronted in representing the
Virginia highway contractors was determining the extent to which
counsel could coordinate the defense of his clients with the defense
efforts of other subjects of the bid rigging investigation. Although
it may be apparent to the attorney that sharing information with
other counsel may benefit the client, the attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client and not to the attorney.17 Indeed, the privi-
lege may be waived only at the client's option.2" The Virginia Code
of Professional Responsibility provides, generally, that an attorney
shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege to anyone, unless the client's permission is obtained after full
disclosure. 9
It is natural that, in these situations, the client will look to the
attorney for advice regarding any adverse consequences that might
flow from disclosing information to third parties. In advising cli-
ents on the desirability of sharing privileged information in bid rig-
ging investigations, the attorney should warn clients that the privi-
lege is generally deemed waived upon disclosure to third parties,30
but that the waiver doctrine is not applicable when the disclosure
is made for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information
pursuant to a joint defense effort.31 This exception to the rule of
waiver has come to be known as the "joint defense exception." The
leading case in the joint defense area is Chahoon v.
Commonwealth.2
Chahoon was a criminal conspiracy case in which several defen-
dants were tried together. Prior to trial, the defendants had met
together with their lawyers to map out defense strategy. At the
trial, one of the codefendant's attorneys was asked to testify re-
27. Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273, 287 (1814).
28. Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 287, 183 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1971) (citing
Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 648-49, 82 S.E. 718, 719 (1914)).
29. VA. C.P.R., supra note 13, DR 4-101. It should be noted that a lawyer has no obliga-
tion to keep communications made by a client concerning a future intention to commit a
crime privileged. Id. DR 4-101(D)(1).
30. See, e.g., Cook v. Hayden, 183 Va. 203, 224, 31 S.E.2d 625, 633-34 (1944) (holding that
a communication made in the presence of the client's adverse party was not privileged).
31. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 33-34.
32. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
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garding privileged information revealed at the joint defense meet-
ing. The trial court held that the discussions were protected by the
attorney-client privilege, even though revealed to third parties.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, concluding that "it was
natural and reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties .. .
should meet together in consultation with their counsel . .. to
make all necessary arrangements for the defense. 33
The Chahoon rule, providing that exchange of information pur-
suant to a joint defense effort does not constitute a waiver, has
been generally accepted by other courts confronting the issue. 4
The joint defense privilege also has been extended to protect an
attorney's work product.3 5 The work product privilege should ap-
ply to all oral communications and to traditional work product
items such as interviews with witnesses and memoranda prepared
at the pre-indictment investigative stage.8 6
In the Virginia bid rigging investigation, defense attorneys were
quite successful in keeping abreast of the progress of the investiga-
tion, thanks to the coordinated efforts of several dozen defense at-
torneys from across Virginia, who joined together in what was la-
beled the "Joint Defense Group." This group was organized and
coordinated by several of the larger firms in Richmond. At its peak
in 1981, more than forty-five highway contractors and their counsel
were members of the Joint Defense Group. The members received
regular memoranda on the progress of the government's investiga-
tion, which included identification of witnesses who had testified
33. Id. at 839.
34. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that statements made by a codefendant to defense attorney's investigator were privileged);
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that information
shared among attorneys representing different clients is privileged if it deals with common
trial strategies or defenses); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th
Cir. 1964) (citing Chahoon in support of the "joint defense exception").
35. American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 447 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (hold-
ing that work product immunity is not waived when material is exchanged among joint par-
ties because it is assumed parties with a common interest will not disclose to opposing par-
ties); Transmirra Prod. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(holding that attorneys' exchange of "work products" does not necessarily render the mate-
rial discoverable if their clients have a common interest). Of course it is important to re-
member that all work product, even that which an attorney keeps absolutely confidential,
may be discovered if there is good cause. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The attorney client privi-
lege, however, if present, is absolute. Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273, 286-87 (1814).
36. See, e.g., Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (hold-
ing that memoranda exchanged by attorneys representing different defendants in an anti-
trust suit were immune from discovery due to the work product privilege).
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before the grand jury, rumors and actual reports of pending indict-
ments, positions the government was taking with respect to immu-
nity and plea bargains, and the names and addresses of attorneys
for witnesses. Witness information was obtained so that other
counsel could contact the attorneys to obtain information regard-
ing the witness's testimony.
Realizing that case law generally recognized the joint defense ex-
ception, defense attorneys had an ethical duty to be sure that they
did not conduct the joint defense effort in a manner that would
possibly have been construed as a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. The attorneys were very careful to have each member
firm and individual attorney execute a Joint Defense Confidential-
ity Agreement. This document contained recitals pertaining to the
existence of the highway bid rigging investigation, along with ex-
press recognition "that a joint defense effort is in [our] common
interest and -is desirable to facilitate effective and economic legal
representation, including formulation of defenses and strategy
." The Agreement also recited that
[t]he parties desire to cooperate in such a joint defense effort and to
exchange work product and other confidential or privileged informa-
tion . . . [without waiving] any attorney client, work product or
other privilege, or to engage in any act or omission that would in any
way obstruct, interfere with, or otherwise improperly threaten the
integrity of ongoing investigations or grand jury proceedings.
2. Grand Jury Monitoring
The Joint Defense Agreement provided for sharing of expenses,
including the most successful and controversial aspect of the joint
defense effort-the monitoring of the investigating grand jury. The
monitoring consisted initially of obtaining information about the
grand jury meeting schedule from members of the joint defense
group whose clients had received a subpoena to testify on a given
date. Once the group knew that at least one of the members would
have a client testifying in a given session, defense attorneys were
able to discover and interview other witnesses at the grand jury
session about whom they had not had any previous information.
On the days that the grand jury met (generally two to three days
per month), the group posted a monitor, usually a paralegal or
young attorney, in a position to see who came in and out of the
grand jury meeting room. The monitor would attempt to obtain
1985]
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the name and address of the witness, the witness's counsel's name,
address and telephone number, and would ask permission to inter-
view the witness following his or her testimony. The group was
careful to determine whether or not the witness was represented,
so as not to run afoul of the Virginia Code of Professional Respon-
sibility which bars direct contact with one who is represented by
counsel, unless the witness's counsel consents.37 The monitor's re-
quest for a full debriefing interview would occasionally be granted,
but more often than not, the group would receive a summary of
the testimony from the witness's attorney, or would be flatly re-
fused any information.
In establishing and conducting this grand jury watch, the group
was mindful of the ethical considerations governing its conduct.
Primarily, although there is no direct ethical proscription against
interfering with the grand jury processes, one can read into Canon
7-pertaining to representing a client zealously within the bounds
of the law-a "gloss" requiring an attorney to consider whether his
conduct will in any way interfere with the administration of jus-
tice.38 Several Disciplinary Rules within Canon 7 could be inter-
preted to prohibit activity which could obstruct the functioning of
a grand jury. For example, a lawyer shall not "[i]ntentionally or
habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence,
where such conduct is disruptive of the proceedings." 39 Although
the foregoing rule appears to be expressly limited to a situation
where an attorney is appearing "in his professional capacity before
a tribunal, '40 it could be interpreted to prohibit obstructing the
functioning of a grand jury.41 Moreover, the harrassment of jurors
is clearly forbidden.42 Although these rules apply directly only to
contact with petit jurors, one may conclude that it is ethically im-
37. During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) communi-
cate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in the matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party of it authorized to do so.
VA. C.P.R., supra note 13, DR 7-103(A).
38. See, e.g., id. EC 7-9 (asserting that a lawyer may ask his client to forego action he
believes unjust); id. EC 7-10 (asserting that the lawyer has a duty to treat all persons in-
volved in the legal process with consideration).
39. Id. DR 7-105(C)(5).
40. Id. DR 7-105(C).
41. Even if an attorney is not representing any witnesses at the grand jury, he is arguably
acting in a professional capacity when he seeks to question the witnesses, since he is actively
representing his own client, who may be involved in the grand jury investigation.
42. Id. DR 7-107; EC 7-27.
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proper to attempt to speak with any grand jurors. Furthermore,
such contact may be construed as an obstruction of justice under
federal law.43
An additional concern with monitoring a grand jury is Canon 9,
which provides that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.44 An Ethical Consideration states that on occasion
even "ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be un-
ethical.' '45 Mindful of these considerations, the group concluded
that careful monitoring of the grand jury in the manner in which it
did was proper.
For support of the right of defense counsel to interview grand
jury witnesses, one must look first to the provisions of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure governing grand jury secrecy. The
general rule of grand jury secrecy is that:
A grand juror, an interpretor, a stenographer, an operator of a re-
cording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an at-
torney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is
made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these
rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except
in accordance with this rule."
Absent from the list of persons placed under the obligation of
secrecy are witnesses appearing before the grand jury. This point is
expressly made in the notes of the Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules, where it is stated:
The rule does not impose any obligation of secrecy on witnesses.
The existing practice on this point varies among the districts. The
seal of secrecy on the witnesses seems an unnecessary hardship and
may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make disclosure
to counsel or to an associate. 47
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982) (making it an obstruction of justice to attempt to influence a
grand or petit juror or any officer of the court). A person convicted of an obstruction of
justice may be fined up to $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both. Id.
44. VA. C.P.R., supra note 13, Canon 9.
45. Id. EC 9-2 (emphasis added).
46. FED. R. CraM. P. 6(e)(2).
47. FED. R. CRL. P. 6 advisory committee note; see also First Amendment Coalition v.
Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 579 F. Supp. 192, 216 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that Rule
6(e) prohibits any instruction to a witness that his testimony is secret); cf. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 558 F. Supp. 532, 535 (W.D. Va. 1983) (holding that although witnesses at a
1985]
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Indeed, courts have consistently held that grand jury witnesses are
free to discuss their testimony with anyone they choose.4" In 1983,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia, following this rationale, denied a motion by the United
States Attorney's Office in Roanoke to enjoin a grand jury watch in
a criminal tax investigation. Judge Turk, in In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings,49 went so far as to hold that defense counsel have first
amendment rights of free speech and association that apply to
communications with grand jury witnesses? °
Several months after the monitoring of the bid rigging grand
jury had reached its peak, but while such activity was continuing
in Alexandria, the United States Attorney's Office made a bold ef-
fort to have the judges of the Eastern District of Virginia amend
the Local Rules of Practice to prohibit "loiter[ing] or remain[ing]
in the hallways or waiting areas of any floor of any courthouse in
this district while a grand jury is in session or is about to com-
mence." The proposed rule would have, in effect, shut down the
monitoring operation. Several of the law firms that were active in
the monitoring process became aware of the request for a local rule
change and filed a memorandum of law opposing adoption of the
rule.51 To date, the court has taken no action in response to the
request of the United States Attorney.
The position of the United States Attorney, as expressed in a
memorandum of law supporting the rule, was that the group's
"surveillance" of the grand jury enabled them to "observe who ap-
pears before the Grand Jury, how long they remain, whether the
witness brings documents or other tangible evidence, and, in gen-
eral, and without any contest by the witness, all the circumstances
regarding his appearance." The United States Attorney character-
grand jury proceeding have a right to discuss their testimony with third parties, the govern-
ment may indicate that it would prefer that the witnesses remain silent).
48. In re Investigation before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 606-07 n.11 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (stating "there is no general obligation on the part of a grand jury witness to
refrain from disclosing the contents of his testimony before the grand jury"); In re Vescovo
Special Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that witnesses may be
interviewed after testifying at a grand jury proceeding); In re Grand Jury Summoned Octo-
ber 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238, 240 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (stating that "[w]hile the relevant case
law is not abundant. . . [t]he cases show that secrecy of grand jury proceedings may not be
imposed upon witnesses.").
49. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 558 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. Va. 1983).
50. Id. at 535.
51. Copies of the Memorandum submitted to the court by the United States Attorney's
Office and the Response Memoranda are on ifie with the author.
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ized counsel's ability to monitor the grand jury as "an accident of
courthouse architecture and supervised by counsel's self interested
judgment occurring in the adjacent hallway." The cases cited by
the government, however, were those cases which admittedly held
that "[t]he person who is the subject of [a grand jury] investigation
has no right to require a witness to divulge such information.
52
The proposed local rule was also purportedly justified on the
ground that it would expand "the witness's freedom to decide
whether to disclose his testimony or the degree of his cooperation."
The memorandum also indicated that "only if counsel are barred
from the courthouse will the witness be able to make that decision
without pressure from the interests of persons he may have incrim-
inated only minutes before."
The defense attorney could certainly argue that as long as a wit-
ness is free to disclose his testimony to whomever he wants, and
under such circumstances as he desires, defense counsel must have
an unfettered right of access to these individuals. Indeed, counsel
may well have a duty to make use of the monitoring process to
fulfill a professional responsibility to represent his clients "compe-
tently" and "zealously" within the bounds of the law.53 Of course,
the grand jury witness has no obligation to provide any informa-
tion requested of him. 4
On the other hand, there is certainly at least some merit to the
idea that monitoring can affect the functioning of the grand jury to
the extent that witnesses might be discouraged from coming for-
ward, if they know their identities will be revealed once they are
seen by a monitor entering or exiting the grand jury room. Based
on experience in the bid rigging cases and also based on an under-
standing of the case law, it appears that the proposed solu-
tion-barring counsel from the courthouse while the grand jury is
in session-would be worse than the "problem" as perceived by the
United States Attorney's Office.
52. See, e.g., In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 605 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding
that a witness may communicate information concerning his testimony in a grand jury pro-
ceeding solely at his or her option).
53. VA. CP R, supra note 13, Canons 6 & 7.
54. In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 605 F.2d at 127.
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III. CONCLUSION
This article has tried to present an overview of interesting ethi-
cal issues which arise during bid rigging cases. Each case impli-
cated difficult issues under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The ethical issues described in this article are applicable to nearly
every large scale criminal investigation, including most "white-col-
lar type" criminal cases, and even some civil matters. All impor-
tant ethical issues appear to involve a balancing of one set of inter-
ests against another. Therefore, there is frequently no "right"
answer. If an attorney thoughtfully considers ethical issues in con-
nection with his day-to-day practice, he will not only be doing a
service to his client, the public and his profession, but to himself as
well.
